Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2020

Pews, Sidelines, and Locker Rooms: Moment of Silence Policy is
the “Hail Mary” to Achieve Constitutionality of Prayer in PublicSchool Athletic Contests
Rachel Amber Frost

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Pews, Sidelines, and Locker Rooms:
Moment of Silence Policy is the “Hail Mary” to Achieve Constitutionality of Prayer in
Public-School Athletic Contests

Rachel Amber Frost
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020
Religion and the First Amendment
AWR Submission for AWR Consideration
Date: December 6, 2019
2

I.

Introduction

It is a crisp, autumn Friday night in the United States. We eagerly watch as the high school
football game is about to begin.
The players kneel before their game to say a prayer for good luck and safety. It may sound
like this:
O God, you gave us bodies—
as well as minds and hearts—
with which to praise and worship you.
Our sports and exercises are a fitting use of gifts
and talents you have given us.
Bless our workouts and the games we play,
and those with whom we exercise or compete.
Give us strength, endurance, courage
and agility as we compete or train.
Keep us safe and healthy as we celebrate
our physical and mental skills in sport.1
Throughout the game, as the players score, they may say a quick celebratory prayer in the
endzone or kiss their hand and raise their pointer finger up to the sky expressing, gesturing, and
symbolizing “Thank you, God.” With two minutes left in the game and a tied score, the
quarterback for the home team throws a “Hail Mary” pass2 to win the game.
Religion and sports are inextricably linked. There is a long, intertwined history between
religion and sport. However, while there is widespread recognition of the influence that religion
has in sport, the history between the two areas is not without conflict. Pre-game “rituals,” such as
prayers and gestures of worship, are regularly held before and during athletic contests, particularly
football games, in the United States.3 Pre-game prayers are held in public school locker rooms or

1

A Prayer for Those Involved in Sports, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, https://www.marquette.edu/faith/prayerssports.php.
2
Hail Mary Pass, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (“a long forward pass in football thrown into or near the end zone in a lastditch attempt to score as time runs out — often used figuratively.”), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Hail%20Mary (last visited November 26, 2019).
3
Gill Fried & Lisa Bradley, Applying the First Amendment to Prayer in A Public University Locker Room: An Athlete’s
and Coach’s Perspective, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301 (1994).
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on sidelines prior to the start of an athletic contest. Absent a complaint by a concerned studentathlete or parent to the coach, team, or school, these rather routine rituals are rarely met with
resistance and often undertaken without any thought to its legal consequences.

However,

throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century, courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, were replete with constitutional challenges addressing the extent to which religious
devotional practices should be permitted in the government sector and in public schools.4 In
particular, and as the central focus of this paper, there are the constitutional challenges addressing
the extent to which religious devotional prayer should be permitted in public-school athletics. In
resolving these challenges, the Supreme Court has held that such pre-game prayers and prayer
policies may violate the Establishment Clause.5 As a result, the Supreme Court has limited the
role religion plays in public-school athletic contests.
The First Amendment protects student-athletes by providing them the right to be free from
state imposed religious indoctrination as well as the right to free exercise and free speech as it
relates to religious devotional prayer. In some circumstances, this constitutional protection is also
balanced against a coach’s right to effectively motivate their team without having every word
scrutinized as a government actor. The Religion Clauses – the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause – are incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the

See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (holding that a state’s “Sunday Closing Laws” were secular
in nature and did not violate the Establishment Clause because they gave the citizens a secular day of rest); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983) (holding that the state legislature’s practice of opening each legislative sessions
with a prayer delivered by a chaplain paid from state funds did not violate the Establishment Clause); Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (holding that a statute which forbade an employer’s dismissal
of an employee who refused to work on his Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 566-67 (2014) (holding that the town’s
practice of opening board meetings with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause; the First Amendment did
not require legislative prayer to be nonsectarian, nor was the town required to search beyond its borders for nonChristian prayer givers in order to achieve religious balancing).
5
See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a policy permitting student-led,
student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause).
4
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Fourteenth Amendment.6 There is a symbiotic tension between the Religion Clauses.7 The
Establishment Clause “protects every individual’s right to freedom of belief while the Free
Exercise Clause protects the individual’s freedom to practice his [or her] religion.” 8 Although
these clauses may appear to be straightforward, courts have had substantial difficulty deciding
where to draw the line between permissible religious actions and those that violate the Religion
Clauses.9 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the language of the Religion Clauses is
“at best opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the amendment.”10
Historically, one of the main issues under the Establishment Clause is the separation of church
and state in the realm of education, specifically in the public-school system.11 Accordingly, courts
have widely scrutinized religion in public schools under the Establishment Clause.12 Courts
remain unconcerned with the actions of individual students, such as students voluntarily praying
anytime throughout the school day.13 However, the free exercise rights guaranteed by the
Constitution are violated when government actors, such as school administrators, sponsor a
specific religious practice of prayer.14 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has determined that the

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof …”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,18 (1947) (holding that a New Jersey law providing
public payment of the costs of transportation to and from parochial Catholic schools is not in violation of the
Establishment Clause).
7
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 50 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (stating that establishment and free exercise “were correlative
and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom.”); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (recognizing an internal tension in the First Amendment between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
8
Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1316 n.20 (D.C. N.J. 1977).
9
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971) (“The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter
for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement
are inevitable, lines must be drawn.”); see also Sara S. Davis, Separation of Church and State: Expanding the Purpose
Prong of the Lemon Test, 53 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2001).
10
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
11
DAVID M. ALEXANDER & KERN ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC-SCHOOL LAW 202 (5th ed. 2001).
12
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
13
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313.
14
Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (an oversight from school administration can be deemed
endorsement, encouragement, or participation); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teachers should be
prohibited from participating in religious exercises because students view teachers as role models).
6
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free exercise of religion will not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause in governmental settings.15 The relationship between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause is made even more complicated when student-athletes and
coaches exercise their religious beliefs by praying at a public-school athletic contest.
Prayer in public-school athletic contests may sometimes conflict with the Religion Clauses
because sidelines and locker rooms serve as modern-day pews for some student-athletes and
coaches. In most cases, the player’s interest in practicing his or her religion is weighed against a
coach’s right to motivate his or her team or a mandated school prayer policy. These interests and
rights must be examined in light of any action undertaken by a government or government actor
to determine if those actions constitute the establishment of religion by the state or the infringement
of a player’s right to freely exercise religious devotional prayer. Despite the seeming discord
between the Religion Clauses, both free exercise and non-establishment can be achieved through
the proper implementation of a moment of silence policy in public-school athletic contests. A
moment of silence would be voluntary, uncoerced, and neutral for the secular purpose of furthering
individualized reflection prior to the start of public-school athletic contests. This practice would
not violate the Free Exercise Clause as it neither impinges on a student-athlete’s rights nor curtails
a coach’s right to effectively motivate his or her team. Moreover, this practice would not violate
the Establishment Clause as such a policy cannot be misconstrued as endorsing a particular
religious practice.
This paper will examine the history of religion in sport; the framework and application of the
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and its free speech implications, especially in the
context of religious devotional prayer in public schools; and the solution to achieving both free

15

Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
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exercise and non-establishment through the proper implementation of a moment of silence policy
in public-school athletic contests.
II.

Muscular Christianity

At the end of the nineteenth century, the convergence of religion and organized sports became
integral to the American lifestyle with the movement referred to as “Muscular Christianity.”
Muscular Christianity is simply defined as the “Christian commitment to health and manliness.”16
The origins of muscular Christianity can be traced back to Paul the Apostle and the New
Testament, which affirms manly exertion17 and physical health.18 However, this ideology was not
always a central tenet of Christianity.
The Muscular Christianity movement originated in nineteenth century Victorian England
amidst industrialization and urbanization.19 This theological offshoot proposed the idea that male
physical perfectibility was a paradigm for religion and social order. 20 The term “Muscular
Christianity” most likely first appeared as a literary term in an 1857 English review of Charles
Kingsley’s novel Two Years Ago (1857).21 Much of Kingsley’s work reflected his commitment to
the political enfranchisement of the working class during the Industrial Revolution in Great
Britain.22 One year later, the same phrase was used to describe Tom Brown’s School Days, an
1856 novel about life at “Rugby School” by fellow Englishman Thomas Hughes.23 Hughes wrote,

16

See
generally
Clifford
Putney,
Muscular
Christianity,
INFED.ORG,
(2003).
www.infed.org/christianeducation/muscular_christianity.htm.
17
Mark 11:15 (English Standard) (“When they arrived in Jerusalem, Jesus entered the temple courts and began to
drive out those who were buying and selling there. He overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of
those selling doves.”).
18
1 Cor. 6:19-20 (English Standard) (“Do you not know that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in
you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore, honor God
with your bodies.”); see also Putney, supra note 16.
19
See Phillip J. Sweitzer, Drug Law Enforcement in Crisis: Cops on Steroids, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP.
PROBS. 193, 211 (2004).
20
Id. at 210.
21
Putney, supra note 16.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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“muscular Christians hold [to] the old chivalrous and Christian belief, that a man’s body is given
him to be trained and brought into subjection, and then used for the protection of the weak, the
advancement of all righteous causes, and the subduing of the earth which God has given to the
children of men.”24 Soon after, the press referred to both writers and their genre of novels rife
with moral principles and manly Christian heroes, as “muscular Christians.”25
Hughes and Kingsley critiqued that Christianity, and specifically the Anglican church, had
been weakened by effeminacy.26 Society was worried that religion had become over effeminized
due to increases in both male employment in white-collar jobs and female involvement in Christian
churches.27 Kingsley’s work, in turn, greatly influenced the Victorian fundamentalist theologian
Charles Haddon Spurgeon.28 Through their work, the central tenet of Muscular Christianity was
realized.29 Spurgeon exerted great influence over emerging American muscular Christians, such
as an evangelist and publisher D. L. Moody, and pioneer psychologist G. Stanley Hall.30 Hall
pointed to the imbalance of women to men in the pews as evidence that there existed a “woman
peril” in American Protestant churches.31 They also contended that women’s influence in church
had led to “an overabundance of sentimental hymns, effeminate clergymen and sickly-sweet
images of Jesus.”32 Critics argued that such characteristics were revolting to “real men” and
insisted that men would avoid church until feminized Protestantism gave way to Muscular
Christianity.33

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91
IOWA L. REV. 821, 848-49 (2006).
28
Sweitzer, supra note 19.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Putney, supra note 16.
32
Id.
33
Id.
25
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Athletics, which developed “physical presence, stoic courage in the endurance of pain, and
judgment under pressure,” were purposefully praised as the antidote to these weaknesses by
making religion a manly endeavor. 34 Based on this theory and spurred on by the moral corruption
of cities during the Industrial Revolution, organized youth sports were first introduced to young
boys as means of socialization and education.35 Muscular Christianity eventually found its way
into mainstream American life in the form of the Young Men’s Christian Association (“YMCA”)
and the Boy Scouts.36
In fact, Spurgeon was largely responsible for introducing the YMCA to the United States.37
The YMCA was one of the first organizations devoted to youth sports as a way to “nurture the
healthy development of children … [and] strengthen families” through important social values,
such as “caring, honesty, respect and responsibility” found in sports.38 The first American branch
opened in Boston in 1851; in 1866, the New York branch added a gymnasium.39 The YMCA
fostered an environment not only for the integration of sports and societal values, but also the
creation of sports themselves. For example, in 1891, muscular Christian James Naismith invented
basketball while studying at a YMCA in Springfield, Massachusetts.40 Soon after, the YMCA
invented volleyball and sponsored hiking, biking, baseball, and rowing clubs.41

Buzuvis, supra note 27, at 849; see also Mystic Seaport, The Protestant Work Ethic, (October 12, 2019) (“Nothing
brought down the wrath of ministers and lay people quicker than the ‘sin’ of idleness. Honest labor could bring a
person closer to God than any other world action, except of course, prayer.”).
35
See Jenni Spies, Only Orphans Should Be Allowed To Play Little League:* How Parents Are Ruining Organized
Youth Sports for Their Children and What Can Be Done About It, * Telephone Interview with Gary Spies, Former
President, Loyalsock Township Little League, (Oct. 10, 2004).,13 SPORTS LAW. J. 275, 276 (2006).
36
Lisa Miller, Manliness is Next to Godliness, NY MAG, (Aug. 31, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/sports/tebowsanchez/tim-tebow-christianity-2012-9/.
37
Putney, supra note 16.
38
Spies, supra note 35.
39
Sweitzer, supra note 19, at 212-13.
40
Miller, supra note 36.
41
Putney, supra note 16.
34

9

In the latter half of the 20th century, advocates within the Muscular Christianity movement
began boxing, viewing sports as a way to increase a man’s physical and moral strength.42 In fact,
former President Theodore Roosevelt was a firm advocate of the movement out of fear that
American men would lose their masculinity.43 Roosevelt boxed throughout college and his
Presidency.44 On the sport of boxing, he once stated:
The men who take part in these fights are as hard as nails, and it is not worthwhile
to feel sentimental about their receiving punishment which as a matter of fact they
do not mind. Of course, the men who look on ought to be able to stand up with the
gloves, or without them, themselves; I have scant use for the type of sportsmanship
which consists merely in looking on at the feats of someone else.45
Roosevelt viewed factors such as urbanization, sedentary office jobs, and non-Protestant
immigration as threats not only to men’s health and manhood but also to their privileged social
standing.46 To maintain such social standing, Roosevelt urged “old stock” Americans to embrace
a “strenuous life” replete with athleticism and aggressive male behavior.47 Accordingly,
supporters urged their churches to abandon the tenets of “feminized” Protestantism.48
The zenith of Muscular Christianity in America lasted from about the 1880s to the early
1930s.49 Muscular Christianity was later met with resistance from Protestant leaders, such as
Harry Emerson Fosdick, who held this theological branch responsible for encouraging militarism,
and satirists, such as Sinclair Lewis, who disparaged Muscular Christianity in their writings.50 By
the 1930s the Neo-Orthodoxy of Reinhold Niebuhr, who preached that divinity flourished not in

42

Iulia Taranu, MMA Fighting is a Right Worthy of Protection Under the First Amendment, 6 Ariz. St. Sports & Ent.
L.J. 170 (2016).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Putney, supra note 16.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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men’s muscles, but with God, became increasing popular in Protestant churches.51 However,
Muscular Christianity still remains a part of the Catholic Church and various Protestant and
Evangelical Christian groups.52 The Catholic Church promotes muscular Christianity in school
athletic programs of schools, such as Notre Dame.53

Other Christian groups, such as the

Fellowship of Christian Athletes,54 also still supports the combination of physical and spiritual
development.55
The Muscular Christianity theological movement undoubtedly has had a sustained impact on
how society views the relationship between sport and religion, as the intersection of the two areas
give rise to constitutional challenges to this day. Today, athletes such as football’s Tim Tebow,56
basketball’s Jeremy Lin,57 baseball’s Josh Hamilton, and boxer Manny Pacquiao, have all
exemplified Muscular Christianity through sharing their faith with their fans.58 The pervasive

51

Id.
Id.; see also Miller, supra note 36 (“Groups like Promise Keepers, an Evangelical Christian parachurch organization
for men since has “attempted to lure men back into the fold by emphasizing their duties as husbands and fathers—
traditional “manly” roles. The group’s revival meetings are often held in sports arenas.”).
53
Putney, supra note 16.
54
See Vision and Mission, THE FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLETES, https://www.fca.org/aboutus/who-weare/vision-mission (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (The Fellowship of Christian Athletes is an international non-profit
Christian sports ministry emphasizing faith and sports. The ministry’s vision is “To see the world transformed by
Jesus Christ through the influence of coaches and athletes.”).
55
Putney, supra note 16.
56
Christine Thomasos, Tim Tebow Brings in a New Wave of Christian Athleticism, The Christian Post (Oct. 20,
2011),
https://www.christianpost.com/news/tim-tebow-brings-in-a-new-wave-of-christian-athleticism-58871/
(“Tebow inspired a new term by ESPN, known as ‘muscular Christianity.’ The QB showcases his faith by wearing
bible verses on his face, tweeting scriptures and publicly admitting his love for Jesus Christ, while drawing fans’
attention on the football field.”); see also Tim Tebow, Through My Eyes, (2011) (“Christians don’t have to be weak,
either in mind, body, or soul.”).
57
Mary Jane Dunlap, KU professor researching Naismith, religion and basketball, KANSAS UNIVERSITY, (Mar. 13,
2012), http://today.ku.edu/2012/03/13/ku-professor-researching-naismith-religion-and-basketball (“Less well-known
is that his game also was meant to help build Christian character and to inculcate certain values of the muscular
Christian movement. Although times have changed, there are analogies between the beliefs and activities of 19thcentury sports figures such as James Naismith and Amos Alonzo Stagg, a Yale divinity student who pioneered football
coaching, and those of 21st-century athletes such as Tim Tebow and Jeremy Lin.”).
58
Miller, supra note 36 (“The scholarly term for this theology—which is also practiced by Jeremy Lin, boxer Manny
Pacquiao, and baseball’s Josh Hamilton—is ‘muscular Christianity,’ and it can be traced back to a Victorian-era
phenomenon in which elite British and American Protestants, concerned that their boys were becoming pale and
flaccid singing hymns in church congregations dominated by women, promoted a version of Christianity that stressed
athleticism and fortitude, cold-water swims and pre-dawn calisthenics.”).
52
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nature of Muscular Christianity has influenced athletes and coaches alike. It is only when studentathletes and coaches exercise their religious beliefs in the context of a public-school athletic contest
that constitutional concerns come to the forefront. Accordingly, this conflict can be best examined
through the eyes of the First Amendment’s Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses.
III.

Constitutional Framework
A. Judicial Standards for Establishment Clause Jurisprudence

The Founding Father’s purpose of the Establishment Clause was to keep church and state
separate as Thomas Jefferson referred to this Clause as “building a wall between church and
State.”59 To help ensure a degree of separation between church and state, a metaphoric wall has
been created by the courts.60 The Supreme Court emphasizes that this erected wall “must be kept
high and impregnable.”61
However, some relation between state and religion is inevitable.

The Supreme Court

recognizes that complete separation of church and state is inconceivable because “no institution
[in society] can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much
less from government.”62
The Establishment Clause63 requires the state to be “neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions then it is to favor them.”64 Essentially, the

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,17 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”); see also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879) (citing Jefferson’s reply to an address by the Danbury Baptist Association).
60
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
62
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
63
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985) (imposing the limitations of the
Establishment Clause on states and their political subdivisions through the Fourteenth Amendment); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussion of the history of the incorporation
of the Establishment Clause).
64
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
59
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clause prohibits government from endorsing or disapproving of specific religion or religious
activity.65

It is well-established that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that the

government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or act in a
way which establishes a state religion or religious faith or tends to do so.66 Accordingly, the
principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the
fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.67
While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence includes several tests for analyzing the validity of
government action under the Establishment Clause, there is no single test that has been determined
to be controlling in every case. As a result, the Court’s use of such various tests creates
inconsistency and uncertainty in predicting the analysis and outcome of a given challenge. Despite
this, the Court has expressed its refusal “to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area.”68

While the Court refuses to be confined, the underlying principle of the

Establishment Clause remains the same; the clause prohibits government from appearing to take a
position on questions of religious belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person’s standing in the political community.”69

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (What is crucial is that a government practice does not
have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion).
66
See id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (…[i]f government is to remain scrupulously neutral in matters of religious
conscience, as our Constitution requires, then it must avoid those overly broad acknowledgments of religious practices
that may imply governmental favoritism toward one set of religious beliefs); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-17 (“Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another . . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa); see also Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 302 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
67
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
68
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
69
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious
institutions…[t]he second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”).
65
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In most Establishment Clause cases relating to public schools, courts have applied — either
independently or in combination — the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the endorsement test.70
Courts tend to view the tests as overlapping, interchangeable approaches.71 While there has been
some guidance, it is rather difficult to predict what test courts will employ in evaluating cases
relating to prayer in a public-school athletic contest. On a scale from elementary school prayer to
prayer opening legislative sessions, such pre-game prayer in public-school athletic contest cases
will likely fall in between the two ends of the continuum. Therefore, I will briefly evaluate each
test and the applicable public-school Establishment Clause cases in turn.
1. The Lemon Test
The three-pronged Lemon test has historically been the most prominent Establishment Clause
test and remains instructive today.72 However, there has been increasing criticism over the use of
the Lemon test in analyzing Establishment Clause issues.73
The Lemon test sets forth three principles that serve as a framework that courts use when
analyzing if a specific government action violates the Establishment Clause.74 Courts have applied

70

See discussion infra Section III.A.1-3.
See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (labeling the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the
endorsement test as the “three traditional tests” in Establishment Clause cases).
72
See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 302, 314 (2000) (explicitly affirming that Lemon is still
good law while effectively applying the “endorsement test,” which slightly alters Lemon’s first two prongs).
73
See generally Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 389 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the
crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced.”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that “[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged”); Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (noting that “this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the
[Lemon] test,” and that there is a “tension in the Court’s use of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause
challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free exercise of religion.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test has “not provided adequate standards for deciding
Establishment Clause cases.”); Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (deriding “the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier described in Lemon.”).
74
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
71
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Lemon in many cases addressing prayer in education at various levels.75 Lemon held that a school
district’s policy must survive a three-prong inquiry: (1) the policy must have a secular legislative
purpose; (2) its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) the policy must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.76
The first prong of the test prompts a court to consider whether the government’s action has a
secular purpose.77 This is regarded as a fairly low hurdle for the state.78 A government action is
not secular if its “actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of” religion or a religious belief.79 In
evaluating a secular purpose, the secular purpose articulated by the legislature must be sincere and
not merely a sham.80 However, the statute need not have exclusively secular objectives.81 Rather,
the focus is on neutrality. The government only violates the “central Establishment Clause value
of officially religious neutrality” when it acts with the perceived and predominant purpose of
advancing religion.82 Courts give a great deal of deference to the government’s professed secular
purpose.83 Accordingly, an action that has a partially secular purpose may still pass muster.84 For
example, in the context of public education, a “moment of silence” law that was found to have
been adopted for the purpose of encouraging school prayer was unconstitutional, even though a

75

See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-92 (1992) (focusing on the coercive nature of prayer at graduation,
rather than explicitly applying the Lemon test affirmed earlier in the opinion); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314; Wallace,
472 U.S. at 55; Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371 (applying the Lemon test in addition to the principles of coercion and
endorsement, when evaluating prayer at the Virginia Military Institute).
76
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
77
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
78
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372 (quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2001)).
79
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56.
80
Id. at 64; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (“[W]hat is relevant is the legislative purpose
of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.”).
81
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 64.
82
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
83
See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 302, 308 (2000); see also Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (“In
evaluating the constitutionality of the supper prayer…we will accord…the benefit of all doubt and credit his
explanation of the prayer’s purposes.”).
84
See Deanna N. Pihos, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause at Public
Universities, 90 CORNELL. L. REV. 1349, 1356 (2005).
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“moment of silence” law, not found to have been adopted for this purpose, would be
constitutionally permissible.85
The second prong prompts the court to consider whether the “principal or primary effect is one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”86 This prong evaluates whether the government favors
or endorses religion or a particular religious belief regardless of the secular purpose originally
professed.87 Case law suggests that this so-called “effects” prong is of utmost significance, yet
difficult to categorize.88 While much of the government’s role inevitably has some effect on
religion, the Court has advised that not every law that confers an “indirect, remote, or incidental”
benefit upon religion is in and of itself constitutionally invalid.89 The Court has focused more
heavily on challenges to aid to, rather than inhibition to, religion. More specifically, the Court is
concerned with financial aid to religious institutions, especially religious schools,90 and activities
that communicate a message of official endorsement for particular religions or for religion in

Only the amendment, which added “or prayer” to the list of what one could do during a moment of silence, was
held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (holding that a state statute that mandated a period of silence
for mediation or prayer was unconstitutional); Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. 2009) ((holding that
a state law that provides for a mandatory moment of silence to be observed in schools in which a student may, as the
student chooses, reflect, pray, meditate, or engage in any other silent activity that is not likely to interfere with or
distract another student is constitutional); Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (a school
prayer or meditation statute which had the sole purpose of returning verbal prayer in public schools was found to be
unconstitutional).
86
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
87
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
88
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (finding that the second prong of the Lemon test
establishes that government programs which “neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion” are not readily subject to Establishment Clause challenges); see also Eric Nasstrom, School
Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting the Walls Separating Church and State, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1065, 1084
(1996).
89
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973)).
90
The Supreme Court has found neutral voucher and transportation programs to be constitutional. See, e.g., Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (holding that a school voucher program did not violate the Establishment
Clause when the program is enacted for a valid secular purpose that is entirely neutral towards religion and consists
of a genuine, private choice, even if the vouchers could be used for private, religious schools); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1,18 (1947) (upholding a New Jersey law enabling a local school district to reimburse parents for the
public transportation costs of sending their children to public and private schools, including parochial schools).
85
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general.91 As a result, school policies or programs that rise to an endorsement or disparagement
of a particular religion violate the Establishment Clause.92 However, neutral school policies or
programs that are reinforced by a genuine, private choice may break any causal chain of a potential
Establishment Clause violation.
The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional all state-sponsored religious practices in the
public schools. These include the recitation of a government-written, short, nondenominational
prayer at the beginning of the school day,93 school-sponsored Bible reading,94 school-sponsored
prayers at a school commencement,95 and the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in
public-school classrooms.96 The Court has also declared unconstitutional state laws prohibiting
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See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that a state statute that mandated a period of silence for mediation or prayer was
unconstitutional); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that nonsectarian prayer at school graduation was
unconstitutional).
92
See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (holding school district’s policy of allowing student to give prayer at home
football games violated Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (holding state practice
only allowing teachers to teach creationism and prohibiting them from teaching evolutionism violated Establishment
Clause because it acted as aid to Christian religion); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir.
1995) (looking at whether using religious theme song will have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion).
93
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (concluding that the prayers amounted to an “official stamp of
approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the
federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause).
94
See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); see also Roark v. South Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573
F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that distributing Bibles during public school sessions was unconstitutional).
95
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (holding that an invocation and convocation during a high school graduation ceremony
were unconstitutional). But see Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
graduation policy that permitted graduating students to vote on whether to have an unrestricted student led message
at the beginning and close of graduation does not violate the Establishment Clause); Jones v. Clear Creek, 977 F.2d
963 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a school district resolution that allowed senior high school
students to make their own decision and vote on whether or not they wanted to allow student-led prayers at the school’s
graduation); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding a university’s selection of a cleric or a
university’s decision to include nonsectarian prayer or invocation at a ceremony not to be excessive entanglement);
Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a graduation policy that allowed student
speakers to deliver a prayer or any other pronouncement); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding
that a graduation ceremony’s prohibition of playing Ave Maria in an instrumental version does not violate
Establishment Clause).
96
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (finding that the posting of religious texts on the wall serves no
such educational function).
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the teaching of evolution in the public schools97 and requiring the teaching of “creation science”
where the school teaches evolution.98
The third and final prong of the Lemon test examines whether the government’s action creates
“excessive government entanglement with religion.”99

Courts consider “the character and

purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.”100 The Court has
primarily expressed concern with engaging in governmental activity that fosters political
divisiveness along religious lines.101 This prong was articulated and applied by the Court in Lemon
to hold unconstitutional a state program supplementing the salaries of parochial schoolteachers of
secular subjects.102
It is important to note that except for the moment of silence case, which was rooted in the
religious purpose prong of the Lemon test, all the other public-school cases focus on the religious
effects prong. More recently, a federal district court found that a school district’s affiliation with
a religious organization such as the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, to raise money for a Christian
mission trip to Guatemala to promote Christianity, failed each prong of the Lemon test.103 Lastly,
as will be discussed in length later, the Supreme Court has ruled that a school district’s policy
allowing student-initiated, student-led prayer prior to public school football games violated the
Establishment Clause.104
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See Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
99
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
100
Id. at 615.
101
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-55 (1985); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24.
102
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. But see Wood v. Arnold, 915 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that teaching Islam as part
of a world history course in high school does not violate the Establishment Clause so long as the Lemon test is met).
103
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2018).
104
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (concluding that the message was public
speech authorized by government policy, taking place on government property at a government sponsored school
event, which could be perceived as actual governmental endorsement of the prayer delivery at a school event).
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2. The Endorsement Test
The endorsement test marginally alters the first two prongs of the Lemon test.105 Rather than
solely focusing on the presence of a secular purpose, the crux of the analysis is whether the
governmental actions convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.106
Government may not endorse one religion over another or religion over nonreligion.107
Accordingly, a government action that has the effect of endorsing religion, whether it intends to
endorse or actually endorses a religion, violates the Establishment Clause regardless of its secular
purpose.108 Justice O’Connor further explained government endorsement of a religion as
“sending a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community,” ultimately leading to the very political and religious divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause aims to prevent.109
3. The Coercion Test
Under the coercion test, if government action “coerces anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise,” the government has violated the Establishment Clause.110 The Supreme
Court has considered the nature of the activity and the practical effect the government action had
on the individuals involved.111 Prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (the first introduction of the
Endorsement Test); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97 (1989); (subsequently adopting the test);
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 316 (confirming an increasing focus on the endorsing nature of state-sponsored prayer in a
public institution context).
106
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
107
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
108
Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-32 (1962) (outlining the effects
of government endorsement of a religion).
109
Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
110
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-92 (1992) (focusing on the coercive nature of prayer at graduation, rather
than explicitly applying the Lemon test affirmed earlier in the opinion).
111
Id. at 593 (recognizing “the undeniable fact … that the school district’s supervision and control of a … graduation
ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least,
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”).
105

19

coercion.112 While the concern may not be limited to the context of public-school education, it is
most pronounced there.113 There are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience
from the subtle coercive pressure that may be present in elementary and secondary public
schools.114 Accordingly, due to the authoritative and influential environment of schools, the
Supreme Court has relied on the coercion test in lower-level public-school prayer cases.115 In
explaining the test, the Supreme Court has suggested that the coercion test’s scope of applicability
may be limited to the context of elementary and secondary public schools.116
B. Overview of the Free Exercise Clause and Implications for Free Speech
A State “cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.”

117

The Free

Exercise Clause protects the exercise or practice of one’s religious beliefs and prohibits the
government from interfering with an individual’s religious practices.118 The Supreme Court has
informed that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible” to
others in order to warrant First Amendment protection.119 The Supreme Court has long recognized
that the government may accommodate religious practices without violating the Establishment

Id. (stating that psychological coercion “though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”); see
also Engel, 370 U.S. at 429-32; Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
113
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
114
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (noting that prayer in the public-school context is more likely to convey the use of the
state’s “machinery” to promote religion); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003 (explaining that
coercion is a consideration in the public-school context because “the expression of religious beliefs … carries the
sanction and compulsion of the state’s authority.”); see also Abington, 374 U.S. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 261-262 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115
See Peter E. Barber, Bishop v. Aronov: "No Talking in Class!"; Does the Elementary School Adage Apply to
University Professors?, 44 ALA. L. REV. 211, 215 (1992).
116
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (“We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the affected citizens are mature
adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school
children in this position.”).
117
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947).
118
See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990).
119
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (quoting Thomas v. Rev.
Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
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Clause.120 While the Religion Clauses often exert conflicting pressures, there is “room for play in
the joints.”121 This room allows the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise
requirements and without offense to the Establishment Clause.122

In essence, religion and

government flourish because each is aware of the “corrosive perils of intrusive entanglements.”123
Therefore, in exercising restraint in infringing on each other, the beneficiaries are a “diverse
populace that enjoy religious liberty in a nation that honors the sanctity of that freedom.”124
There is a fundamental difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses protect.125 The intersection between the Establishment, Free Exercise, and
Free Speech Clauses is highlighted in Widmar v. Vincent.126 In Widmar, a student group sued the
University of Missouri at Kansas City for the right to use state facilities for religious reasons under
the free exercise and free speech clauses.127 The University excluded a student group named
“Cornerstone” from use of its buildings based on one of its regulations denying use of college
facilities “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”128 The Court in Widmar
rejected the university's argument that providing a forum for religious groups had the primary
effect of advancing religion, and instead held that allowing the religious groups access to the forum
would not unconstitutionally “endorse” religion.129 In affirming the circuit court, the Court first
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See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-145 (1987).
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970)).
122
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
123
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2003).
124
Id.
125
See Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
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Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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Id. at 265-66.
128
Id. at 266.
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Id. at 270-75.
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found that the University had created an open forum for its student groups.130 In addition to finding
that First Amendment rights of speech extend to college campuses, and that religious worship and
discussion are forms of protected speech, the Court determined that the University’s regulation
was content-based because the students were excluded due to the religious content of their intended
speech.131 In its reasoning on the Establishment Clause issue, the Court emphasized both that the
open forum created by the University did not “confer any imprimatur of state approval” on religion
and that the forum was open to over one hundred diverse student groups.132 The Court held that
when a state university creates an open forum for student groups to meet, the Establishment Clause
neither requires nor justifies excluding religious groups from the forum. 133 The Court concluded
that an equal access policy for a religious club when university facilities are open to all other
student groups does not violate the Establishment Clause.134 Therefore, if a university creates a
forum generally open for use by student groups, it cannot discriminate against groups based on the
content of their speech.135
In 1984 the Equal Access Act extended the reasoning of Widmar holding to public secondary
schools.136 Under the Equal Access Act, a public secondary school with a “limited open forum”
is prohibited from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a meeting within that forum
on the basis of the “religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
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Id. at 267 (finding that that content-based discrimination against religious speech without a compelling justification
existed); see also Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1320 (8th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that “[a] neutral accommodation
of the many student groups active at UMKC would not constitute an establishment of religion even though some
student groups may use the University’s facilities for religious worship or religious teaching.”).
131
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268-69.
132
Id. at 274.
133
Id. at 277.
134
Id. at 263.
135
Id. at 269-70.
136
See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988).
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meetings.”137 In analyzing the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, the Supreme Court in
Board of Education of the Westside Community School v. Mergens138 considered the
constitutionality of student prayer groups.139 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act
based on its requirement that there be, “a limited open forum, the organization has to be a noncurriculum related group, and state employees can only attend in a non-participatory capacity.”140
While student clubs were encouraged, the school district prohibited clubs from having any sort of
political or religious affiliation.141 In 1985, a group of students sought instatement of a Christian
student club, whose activities included reading the Bible, praying together, and having
fellowship.142 The school district denied the students’ request for instatement and the students
brought a claim arguing that the school district’s refusal to allow the religious student group
violated the Equal Access Act.143

The school district argued that the Act violated the

Establishment Clause because individual legislators were motivated by a desire to protect and
promote religious speech and worship in public schools.144 The Court rejected this argument, and
instead declared that “what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly

See 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 4071(a) and (b); see also 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(b) (A “limited open forum” exists whenever a
public secondary school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to
meet on school premises during noninstructional time); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4072(3) (“Meeting” is defined to include those
activities of student groups which are permitted under a school’s limited open forum and are not directly related to the
school curriculum); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4072(4). (“Noninstructional time” is defined to mean time set aside by the school
before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4072(2)
(“Sponsorship” means the acting of promoting, leading, or participating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher,
administrator, or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the
meeting); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(c)(3) (If the meetings are religious, employees or agents of the school or government
may attend only in a nonparticipatory capacity).
138
See Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990).
139
Id. at 231-36.
140
Id. at 233.
141
Id. at 232.
142
Id. at 232.
143
Id. at 233 (explaining that the Equal Access Act “prohibits public secondary schools that receive federal financial
assistance and that maintain a 'limited open forum' from denying ‘equal access’ to students who wish to meet within
the forum on the basis of the content of the speech at such meetings”); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074.
144
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249.
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religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.”145 The Supreme Court applied the
Lemon test and decided that construing the Equal Access Act to permit religious student groups
does not violate the Establishment Clause because the Act has a secular purpose, 146 the Act’s
primary effect does not advance religion,147 and the Act does not excessively entangle government
with religion.148 Therefore, the Court decided that the Equal Access Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause and it was not unconstitutional for the school to have religious student
groups.149
IV.

Discussion

The Muscular Christianity movement has had a lasting impact on how society views the
relationship between religion and sport. Its emphasis on the combination of physical and spiritual
development inspired organizations and student-athletes to adopt and promulgate its central tenet
— a Christian commitment to health and manliness.150 The YMCA was founded on such
principles and served as a vehicle to instill important social values in young children that may be
realized through playing sports.151 Still today, such social values are professed by professional
athletes who proselytize this faith with their fans.152 Muscular Christianity has widely influenced
athletes and coaches alike in realizing the positive social values that result from an integration of
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Id.
Id. at 248-49 (noting that “because the Act on its face grants equal access to both secular and religious speech,
we think it clear that the Act’s purpose was not to ‘endorse or disapprove of religion.’”); see also Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
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Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52 (noting that high school students are unlikely to “confuse an equal access policy
with state sponsorship of religion;” declaring that “[t]here is little if any risk of official state endorsement or
coercion where no formal classroom activities are involved and no school officials actively participate. . . . To the
extent that a religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should
perceive no message of government endorsement of religion.”).
148
Id. at 252-53 (finding that school officials cannot lead or promote any religious exercises and being that the
proposed religious student group was to have no teacher or faculty advisor, the policy did not violate this
restriction).
149
Id. at 253.
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See Putney, supra note 16.
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See Spies, supra note 35.
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See Thomasos supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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sport and religion. However, its pervasive nature is also its Achilles heel, especially in the context
of public-school education.

An aspect of public-school education that often gives rise to

heightened concern is religious devotional prayer.153 Such concerns may arise where studentathletes or public-school administration, such as teachers and coaches, seek to participate in
student-led religious activity like pre-game team prayer.154 Subsequent challenges to these
concerns usually highlight the play in the joints that exist between the Religion Clauses.155
A. Student-Initiated/Led Prayer
In non-public forums consisting of substantial public-school involvement in regulating school
prayer through policy implementation, courts are likely to find that such involvement exceeds
constitutional limits and violates the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court addressed studentled prayer at high school football games in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.156 In
Santa Fe, the Court held that a Texas public high school policy that authorized a student election,
the winner of which would lead a prayer at school football games, violated the Establishment
Clause.157 The policy, initially entitled “Prayer at Football Games,”158 permitted students to cast
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See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding that a policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (holding that prayer at a public middle school graduation violated the
Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that the practice of hiring a chaplain
to hold prayer at a state legislative session did not violate the Establishment Clause because of the country’s unique
history); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (holding that school-sponsored Bible reading in
public schools violates the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) (holding that that reciting
government-written prayers in public school classrooms violated the Establishment Clause).
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See Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that coach’s acts of participating in pre-game grace
and pre-game prayer constitutes of violation of the Establishment Clause).
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See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that a moment of silence in public schools for meditation
or voluntary prayer violated the Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding the release
of students from public school for religious instruction did not violate the Establishment Clause so long as the
instruction takes place away from the school campus, for one hour per week, and with no public funding); People ex
rel McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that religious instruction in public schools violates the
Establishment Clause); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that regulations that required chapel
attendance by cadets and midshipmen at federal military academies were invalid under the Establishment Clause).
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Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (relying heavily upon Lee).
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Id. at 317.
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Id. at 297-98. As litigation was proceeding through the federal judicial system, the policy name was changed to
omit the word “prayer.” However, a further election was not conducted to sanction this amended policy.
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votes regarding two issues: (1) whether a student would deliver an “invocation and/or message” at
football games; and (2) which student would deliver said message.159 The policy would allow a
student to use the public address system to express the invocations. 160 The students had voted
affirmatively to allow the student-led invocations.161 Subsequently, some students filed suit
against the school district for permitting prayer before the football games.162
The Court found that the school district’s actions unequivocally fostered perceived and actual
endorsement of religion for two main reasons.163 First, the pre-football invocations were given by
a student who held the school-elected position of student council chaplain.164 While the school
district argued that because the prayers were student-initiated and student-led, the prayers
constituted private speech protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court concluded that the
school district unsuccessfully attempted to disentangle itself from religious speech through the
two-step student election process; in fact, the election itself was conducted because the board chose
to permit student-led prayer.165 Second, the Court found that the invocations were authorized by
the school and took place on government property at a government-sponsored school-related
event.166 The Court found that the school district’s policy allowing the student council chaplain
to give an invocation at the beginning of each home football was “invalid on its face because it
establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and
creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school
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events.”167 The court reasoned that the school district’s elections were “insufficient safeguards of
diverse student speech because fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote.”168 Moreover,
the Court held that the plain language of the policy, which used words such as “solemnize” and
“invocation” revealed that it had an unconstitutional purpose.169 The speech allowed under the
policy could not truly be “private speech” because the policy highlighted “invocations,” defined
by the Court as “primarily … an appeal for divine assistance.”170 Therefore, the Court found that,
given the policy’s text and history, such invocations were not private student speech, but rather
public speech because an objective Santa Fe High School student would perceive the pregame
prayer as stamped with the school’s seal of approval.171
With a particular emphasis on the intersection of speech and the Religion Clauses, the Court
stated that not all speech given in government forums constitutes government-sponsored speech,
particularly when the government has created an open forum or limited public forum for individual
free speech.172 However, the Court found that the policy did not establish a limited public forum
for “private speech.”173 Because the school authorized the election and the speech took place on
school property at school events, the Court held that the speech was government-endorsed, rather
than purely private speech. 174 The majority opinion stated:
The delivery of such a message — over the school’s public address system, by a
speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and
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pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer
— is not properly characterized as “private speech.”175
Therefore, while the speech was ultimately delivered by a student, the school’s endorsement of the
speech made it government speech for purposes of the Establishment Clause.176 Moreover, the
Court found that it was not the intention of the school district to create a public forum for voluntary
student speech as the policy did not evidence either “by policy or by practice, any intent to open
the [pregame ceremony] to indiscriminate use, . . . by the student body generally.”177 Furthermore,
the Court emphasized that the degree of school involvement in the prayer process made it clear
that the invocations bear the imprint of the state and put the school-age children who objected in
an untenable position.178 The court was persuaded that “the delivery of a pregame prayer has the
improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”179
Therefore, the Court found that any religious message resulting from the policy would be
attributable to the school and not just to the student.180 Accordingly, the Court held that the
enactment of the policy, “with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student
prayer,” was a constitutional violation.181
Remarkably, the Court stated that, “Of course, not every message delivered under such
circumstances is the government’s own.”182 In fact, the Court recognized broad protection for
voluntary student prayer in public schools as it did not hold that a school district can never create
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a limited public forum for “private” student speech. Significantly, the Court concluded that
nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by the Court prohibits any public-school student from
voluntarily praying before, during, or after the school day; the religious freedom is only infringed
upon, as it was by the school district’s policy in Santa Fe, when the State affirmatively sponsors
the particular religious practice of prayer.183
B. Coach Initiated/Led Prayer
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the constitutional limits of coach
led prayer in public-school athletics in Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District.184 In
1988, Doe was enrolled as a seventh-grade student who qualified for the girls’ basketball team.185
The coach included the Lord’s Prayer in each basketball practice and the team said prayers in the
locker rooms before games began, after games in the center of the basketball court in front of
spectators, and on the school bus travelling to and from games.186 The coach initiated or
participated in these prayers as had been a tradition for almost twenty years.187 Doe initially
participated in the prayers so she would fit in with her teammates, but then decided not to
participate.188 Her lack of participation attracted attention from her peers and spectators as well as
a teacher who referred to Doe as a “little atheist.”189
Doe filed an application for a restraining order and a preliminary injunction forbidding the
school from allowing its employees from “leading, encouraging, promoting, or participating in
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prayer with or among students during curricular or extra-curricular activities, including sporting
events.”190 The district court enjoined the school district, its employees and its agents from
leading, encouraging, promoting, or participating in prayers with or among students
during curricular or extracurricular activities, including before, during, or after
school-related sporting events. Students, however, are not enjoined from praying,
either individually or in groups. Students may voluntarily pray together, provided
such prayer is not done with school participation or supervision.191
In its analysis, the appellate court explained the Establishment Clause’s limits on a
coach’s free exercise. With regard to employee participation in prayer, the school district
contended that it cannot prevent its employees from participating in student prayers without
violating their employees’ rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, freedom of
association, and academic freedom.192 The court disagreed with the school district’s
argument and upheld the district court’s prohibition.193 It noted that “the principle that
government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the
fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”194 The court found this
“particularly true in the . . . context of basketball practices and games.”195

The court

reasoned that the prayers took place during school-controlled, curriculum-related activities
that members of the team were required to attend.196 Because coaches and other school
employees are representative of the school and its policies, the coach’s prayers improperly
entangled the school district in religion and indicated an unconstitutional endorsement of
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religion.197 Accordingly, the court found that the school district’s employees and agents
were properly enjoined from participating in student-initiated prayers.198
In contrast to the approach by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which
focused on how a coach’s prayers may improperly entangle a school district in religion,
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit focused on how a coach’s prayers may
cause a reasonable observer to perceive it as an endorsement of religion in Borden v. School
District of the Township of East Brunswick.199 In 2008, a football coach, Marcus Borden,
sued his school district, claiming that the district’s prohibition of faculty and coaches
participating in prayer violated his rights to free speech, academic freedom, freedom of
association, and due process.200 Borden was the head football coach at East Brunswick
High School.201 During his time as head coach, he led the team in prayer before games and
at the weekly team dinner where players, parents, and cheerleaders were present.202 From
2003-2005, Borden led the prayer at the first team dinner of every season and then selected
a senior player to do so in the subsequent weeks.203 Additionally, Borden would ask the
assistant coaches and players to take a knee as he led them in prayer before each game.204
In 2005, parents complained to the Superintendent about the prayer at the team dinner;
one player even indicated that he was uncomfortable and afraid that Borden would call on
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him to lead the prayer.205 In a memo to Borden and all faculty members, the Superintendent
reminded all faculty and staff that students have a constitutionally protected right to pray
at school so long as it did not interfere with the “normal operations of the school or
district.”206 However, the Superintendent noted, representatives of the school or school
district (teachers, coaches, administrators, board members, etc.) “were prohibited from
encourag[ing,] lead[ing,] initiat[ing,] mandat[ing,] or otherwise coercing student prayer,
either directly or indirectly,” during school time or at any school sponsored event.207
Borden temporarily resigned but soon after returned and filed suit against the district.208
Prior to the commencement of the 2006 football season, Borden asked his team captains to
talk to all of the members of the team to determine if they wanted to continue prayer before
team dinners and games.209 The team voted to continue the pre-meal and pre-game
prayers.210 Accordingly, while Borden no longer led his players in prayer, he continued to
bow his head before team meals and take a knee before each game.211
First, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the limitations of the First
Amendment for coaches and other public-school employees. The court stated, “The day
has long since passed when individuals surrendered their right to freedom of speech by
accepting public employment.”212 However, such rights are not without limitation. Borden
argued that his speech (bowing his head and taking a knee) was protected by the First
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Amendment’s freedoms, including freedom of speech.213 However, the court concluded
that the coach’s speech was not protected speech.214 Rather, the court concluded that
Borden’s conduct violated the Establishment Clause using the Endorsement Test.215 In
reaching their conclusion the court looked to how a reasonable observer familiar with the
history and context of the religious display would perceive Borden’s actions.216 The court
evaluated not only Borden’s bowing of his head before pre-game meals and taking a knee
in the locker room, but also considered Borden’s lengthy history of engaging in religious
activities with the team.217 The court found that his involvement as “an organizer,
participant, and a leader . . . would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that he was
endorsing religion.”

218

However, the court noted that “[w]ithout Borden’s twenty-three

years of organizing, participating in, and leading prayer with his team, this conclusion
would not be so clear… .”219 Despite ruling against Borden, the Third Circuit contemplated
that a circumstance in which a coach bowing his head or taking a knee out of respect during
a time of student-initiated prayer may not violate the Establishment Clause. The court went
on to state:
If a football coach, who had never engaged in prayer with his team, were to bow
his head and take a knee while his team engaged in a moment of reflection or prayer,
we would likely reach a different conclusion because the same history and context
of endorsing religion would not be present.220

213

Id. at 163.
Id. at 171. The court concluded that that Borden’s speech was not a matter of public concern because it occurred
in private settings, such as the pre-game dinner and locker room and it was intended for the football players (and their
parents) only. Also, the speech was not protected under academic freedom because his speech was intended to be a
pedagogic method, rendering him a “proxy” for the school district.
215
Id. at 175 (finding it unnecessary to analyze Borden’s actions using the coercion test or the Lemon test because his
conduct obviously violated the Establishment Clause using the endorsement test).
216
Id. (citing Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., Pa., 385 F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 2004)).
217
Id. at 176-77.
218
Id. at 176.
219
Id. at 178.
220
Id. at 178-79.
214

33

Next, the court considered whether the school district had the right to adopt the prayer
policies in an effort to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The court found that the
school district’s guidelines and prayer policies were not facially unconstitutional and did
not violate Borden’s constitutional rights.221 The court reiterated that it has held that where
an official at a public school does not have a First Amendment right to his or her expression,
the school district’s policy need not be “reasonably related to a legitimate educational
interest.”222 Thus, because Borden had no First Amendment right to his expression, the
Court needed not to analyze the policy under that standard.223 Nevertheless, it chose to go
through with the analysis to demonstrate that the school district had a right to adopt its
policy because it has a legitimate educational interest of avoiding Establishment Clause
violations and that the prayer policy guidelines were reasonably related to that interest.224
The Supreme Court has stated that “compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state
interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.”225
C. Silent Prayer in Public School Policy
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Silent prayers adopted by the students themselves or implemented by the state for secular
purposes can cultivate an environment where voluntary, uncoerced, individualized reflection prior
to the start of public-school athletic contests can thrive in locker rooms and on sidelines. Silent
prayers that are sponsored by the government, however, can still violate the Establishment Clause.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama Statute which authorized a one
minute period of silence in all public schools “for meditation or voluntary prayer” was a law
respecting the establishment of religion.226 The Court stated that “[a] system which secures the
right to proselytize religions, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant
right to decline to foster such concepts.”227 The Court instructed that “[t]he Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not.”228 The Court cited two
reasons to justify its finding of no secular purpose. First, the law replaced an earlier moment-ofsilence law that had not mentioned prayer; because that earlier law already protected the right to
pray (without saying so), the purpose of the later law had to be to “endorse” and “promote”
prayer.229 Second, the majority also relied on statements by the law’s sponsor, State Senator
Donald Holmes, that the law’s purpose was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools.230
Thus, the statute was struck down because it did not have a secular purpose and the motivation for
passing the statute was to advance religion.231 To be a valid moment of silence, the practice has
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to be adopted with purely secular intentions.232 While the statute in Wallace could not withstand
scrutiny based upon an analysis of the actual statutory language, the reason behind the statute, or
its practice, members of the Court appear to have agreed that properly implemented moment ofsilence laws could be constitutional.233
V.

Solution: A Properly Implemented Moment of Silence Policy in Public School

The Muscular Christianity movement left an indelible impact on the relationship between sport
and religion. Its pervasive influence inspires the religious spirit of student-athletes and coaches
while challenging the extent to which religious devotional prayer should be permitted in publicschool athletic contests. As can be derived from caselaw and modern-day controversies that
surround religious devotional prayer in public-school athletic contests, anything less than a
properly implemented moment of silence policy would require strict adherence to the First
Amendment.
Coach-initiated prayer, student-initiated prayer, and government endorsed prayer policies
highlight the conflicts of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses in the context
of public-school athletic contests. Regarding coach-initiated prayer, a coach’s initiation of or
participation in prayer may improperly entangle the school district in religion and indicate an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion because coaches are viewed as representatives of the
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school and its policies.234 Regarding student-initiated prayer, the Supreme Court has recognized
broad protection for voluntary student prayer in public schools. In Santa Fe, the student-athlete’s
religious freedom is only infringed upon, as it was by the school district’s policy, when the State
affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.235 Moreover, a school policy
addressing prayer in public-school athletic contests that is improperly implemented may prevent a
student-athlete’s ability to freely exercise their right to pray or, conversely, may impose mandatory
prayer on a nonreligious student-athlete. In each scenario, a government or government actor’s
involvement can deprive coaches and student-athletes of the genuine, meaningful choice of
whether to engage in religious devotional prayer. However, in reconciling the above, there is a
solution that would simultaneously achieve both free exercise and non-establishment of religion.
In Santa Fe, the Court did not hold that a school district can never create a limited public forum
for “private” student speech; the Court concluded that nothing in the Constitution as interpreted
by the Court prohibits any public-school student from voluntarily praying before, during, or after
the school day.236 To this end, the Supreme Court appears to have also agreed that properly
implemented moment of silence policies and laws could be constitutional in the public-school
context.237 Therefore, a properly implemented moment of silence policy in public schools is the
solution to simultaneously achieve both free exercise and non-establishment of religion.
The most constitutionally permissible approach to allowing prayer in locker rooms and on
sidelines would be for a public-school district to properly implement a moment of silence policy.
This moment of silence policy would be a voluntary, uncoerced, and neutral policy implemented
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for the secular purpose of furthering individualized reflection prior to the start of public-school
athletic contests. A school policy that permits a moment of silence means that individuals can
pray in the locker rooms and on the sidelines without compromising one’s free exercise of religion,
jeopardizing the religious liberties of others, or disrespecting the required degree of separation
between church and state. Accordingly, such school policy would neither impinge on a studentathlete’s rights to make the choice to pray nor curtail a coach’s right to effectively motivate his or
her team. The practice of reflecting, meditating, and praying are each products of a genuine,
private choice. Particularly, a school policy permitting a moment of silence to be observed before
an athletic contest in which a student may, if the student chooses, reflect, pray, or meditate, allows
a student to make a genuine, private choice — to reflect and “get in the zone” however they may
choose to do so, or not to do so, at all. If a coach or student-athlete opts to use that moment of
silence to pray, then that is their genuine, private choice. Accordingly, properly implemented
“moment of silence” policies are effective because coaches and student-athletes will not know
whether their peers use the silent moment for inner reflection, meditation, or prayer.
VI.

Conclusion

A government’s denial of prayer is just as unconstitutional as a government’s endorsement of
prayer. Just as there is room for play in the joints between the Religion Clauses, there is room to
achieve constitutionality in the incorporation of religious devotional prayer in public-school
athletic contests. Both free exercise and non-establishment can be achieved through a properly
implemented moment of silence. Such moment of silence would be voluntary, uncoerced, and
neutral for the secular purpose of furthering individualized reflection prior to the start of publicschool athletic contests.
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Firstly, this practice would not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The practice of reflecting,
meditating, and praying are each products of a genuine, private choice. Therefore, a school policy
permitting a moment of silence to be observed before an athletic contest in which a coach or
student-athlete may, as they choose, reflect, pray, or meditate, allows a coach or student-athlete to
make a genuine, private choice — to reflect and “get in the zone” however they may choose to do
so, or not to do so, at all. If a coach or student-athlete opts to use that moment of silence to pray,
then that is their genuine, private choice. Such a policy would neither impinge on a studentathlete’s rights to make the choice to pray nor curtail a coach’s right to effectively motivate his or
her team.
Secondly, this practice would not violate the Establishment Clause. A school policy permitting
a moment of silence to be observed before an athletic contest cannot be misconstrued as endorsing
or advancing a particular religious practice. The purpose of a moment of silence policy is secular
and neutral in nature; the purpose is to further individualized reflection prior to the start of publicschool athletic contests. The moment allows a student-athlete to make a genuine, private choice
as to how he or she will use that time, and the student may or may not use that time to pray.
Therefore, a moment of silence policy reinforced by a secular purpose and a genuine, private
choice breaks any causal chain of a potential Establishment Clause violation.
In conclusion, a properly implemented moment of silence policy in public schools may be the
ultimate “Hail Mary” that is needed to achieve constitutionality of prayer in the modern-day pews
that are sidelines and locker rooms.
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